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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
SECTION I:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This appeal involves six issues relating to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the
Clean Water Act ("Clean Water Act," "CWA," or "Act"), CWA
§§ 101-606, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), and the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
The first issue is whether contaminated soil beneath a manu-
facturing facility is a "point source" under the Act, CWA § 502(14),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), and, therefore subject to National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit requirements,
CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The second issue addresses whether
the alleged discharge of pollutants into navigable waters in viola-
tion of existing state water quality standards is actionable under
the Clean Water Act. CWA §§ 301(a), 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(a), 1365(a)(1). Issues three, four, and five ask whether
the CWA preempts actions sounding in federal and state common
law nuisance. The sixth issue addresses whether claims for reim-
bursement and summary judgment under CERCLA § 113(f), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f), can stand in the absence of a pending or previous
action under CERLCA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, and where one of
the claimants is also a party to the action.
In response to public outcry over the degradation of the coun-
try's waters, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters." CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The re-
sponsibility for enforcing the Act's requirements is shared be-
tween the federal and state governments. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has the responsibility
of administering the statute, CWA § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d),
but must do so in cooperation with "State and local agencies" in a
manner that develops "comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources." CWA § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). With the
CWA, Congress provided "recognition, preservation, and protec-
tion of [the] primary responsibilities and rights of States ... to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development
and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of
land and water resources" in consultation with the EPA. CWA
§ 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). The public also plays a meaningful
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role in the CWA, both through "public participation in the develop-
ment, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, ef-
fluent limitation, plan, or program" established by the EPA or the
states, CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e), as well as through its
ability to bring "citizen suits" against alleged polluters, CWA
§ 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
The NPDES permitting system is the "centerpiece of the
Clean Water Act." E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Cop-
per Recycling, Inc., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000).
Congress established the NPDES permitting system within the
Act to control the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters.
CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The basic prohibition of the
NPDES is of the addition of a pollutant from a point source into
navigable waters without a permit. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
Either the EPA, or a qualifying state regulatory entity issues
NPDES permits or their state equivalents, commonly known as
State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") per-
mits. CWA §§ 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), (b). Before the
designated regulator can issue an NPDES or SPDES permit, the
Act requires that the applicant receive certification from the state
in which the affected water body is located. CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341. A state will grant an applicant certification only when the
proposed permit complies with specific state criteria. Id. The Act
also requires that states inventory and classify their water bodies
according to specified categories of "use" criteria. See CWA § 303,
33 U.S.C. § 1313. States must then develop water quality stan-
dards that consist of designated uses for the water bodies and
water quality criteria that support the designated uses. Id. Fi-
nally, the Act requires that the designated regulator incorporate
effluent limitations based on these water quality standards into
the NPDES or SPDES permits. CWA §§ 301, 402, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1342. In summary, the Clean Water Act establishes a
comprehensive program to control point source pollution through
the shared authority of federal and state regulators.
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, commonly known as
Superfund, was enacted by Congress on December 11, 1980. CER-
CLA created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and
provided broad federal authority to respond directly to releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger
public health or the environment. In general, CERCLA allows the
government to bring cost-recovery actions against potentially re-
sponsible parties ("PRPs") for the clean-up of designated contami-
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nation sites. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. In addition,
the statute allows PRPs to bring suit against each other, either in
contribution or in a cost recovery action for the reimbursement of
expenses incurred during a removal or remediation activity. See
CERCLA §§ 107, 113(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613(f).
Section II of this memorandum presents the facts and proce-
dural history of this case. Section III discusses the facts and law
relating to these six issues. Each count is posed in terms of an
"issue question": The issue's underlying facts are presented, the
positions of the parties are discussed, the pertinent statutory and
case law is cited, and each party's argument is set forth. This
memorandum does not suggest conclusions as to the appropriate
outcome on each issue; instead, such conclusions are left to the
strength of the parties' oral arguments and the discretion of each
judge.
SECTION II:
THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Facts
This is a citizen suit brought by a local environmental advo-
cacy group, Bearclaw Riverkeeper, Inc. ("Appellant-BRK") and a
municipality, Noblesville, in the state of New Union ("Appellant-
Noblesville") against Major Electronics, Inc. ("Appellee"), a for-
profit corporation organized under the laws of and doing business
in Fort Union, in the state of Progress. The Appellants charge
that Appellee is violating the Clean Water Act by discharging
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") from the soil beneath Appel-
lee's Fort Union manufacturing plant, thereby contaminating the
Bearclaw River, the Noblesville public beach, and the fish and
other aquatic life in the river. The Appellants have also brought
claims under CERCLA seeking reimbursement from Appellee of
recovery or response costs related to the cleanup of the beach and
the river.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows. For decades, Appel-
lee has manufactured electrical equipment at its facility located in
Fort Union, Progress. Appellee has an NPDES permit issued by
the EPA under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, which allows it to
discharge treated effluent from its manufacturing process lines
into the Bearclaw River. Until 1980, Appellee used PCBs as heat-
resistant conduction material in the manufacture of many of its
products. In 1980, Appellee stopped using PCBs in its production
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process. PCBs were never a normal part of the wastewater dis-
charge from Appellee's production process, although Appellee's
wastewater discharge was contaminated, from time to time, with
incidental concentrations of PCBs from unknown origins. When
Appellee applied for its initial NPDES permit and subsequently
renewed its permit, Appellee reported occasional low-level concen-
trations of PCBs in its wastewater discharge. The issuing author-
ity did not include a PCB effluent limitation in Appellee's NPDES
permit. All measurements of PCBs in Appellee's wastewater ef-
fluent have been less than the amounts reported in its initial
NPDES permit application and subsequent permit renewals.
Over the years, spills and equipment leaks of PCBs at Appel-
lee's Fort Union manufacturing facility have impregnated the soil
beneath the facility with PCBs. Appellee's manufacturing facility
is located on the banks of the Bearclaw River. The water table
beneath Appellee's manufacturing facility is located up-gradient
from the Bearclaw River. As a result, when it rains, precipitation
soaks into the soil and flows through the soil and groundwater to
the Bearclaw River, carrying with it concentrations of PCBs and
soil particles, which then enter the river.
The Bearclaw River flows across the state boundary from Pro-
gress into New Union at a point that is one mile downstream from
Appellee's manufacturing facility. The town of Noblesville is lo-
cated one mile downstream from the state boundary. The Nobles-
ville public beach and Appellee's manufacturing facility are
situated on the same side of the river. Over the years, PCBs have
migrated from the soil beneath Appellee's manufacturing facility
to the Noblesville public beach where they have contaminated the
soil on the banks, the public beach, and the sediment in the river
itself.
Progress environmental regulators have classified a several-
mile reach of the Bearclaw River starting upstream of Appellee's
manufacturing facility and running to the state line as "Class C"
waters. "Class C" waters are suitable for industrial and non-con-
tact recreational use. Progress does not have water quality stan-
dards for PCBs in "Class C" waters. New Union has classified a
fifty-mile reach of the Bearclaw River starting at the state line
and continuing downstream through and past Noblesville as
"Class B" waters. "Class B" waters are suitable for fishing and
contact recreational use. New Union has water quality standards
of amount X for PCBs in "Class B" waters. Following wet weather
events, concentrations of PCBs in the Bearclaw River downstream
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from Appellee's manufacturing facility and adjacent to the Nobles-
ville public beach exceed amount X. The only known sources of
PCBs in this section of the Bearclaw River are the soil beneath
Appellee's manufacturing facility and the Noblesville public
beach.
Eighty percent of Appellant-Noblesville's population is Proto-
Litigian, which is the largest percentage of this minority group
that resides in any town located in New Union. Overall, approxi-
mately twenty percent of the State's residents are of Proto-Li-
tigian descent. On average, Appellant-Noblesville's population is
just above the poverty level. Appellant-Noblesville is the poorest
town in the State. The town does not have a municipal swimming
pool and, consequently, its residents rely on the Bearclaw River
public beach as a recreation destination. The New Union Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation ("NUDEC") has warned the
residents of Noblesville that using the public beach and swimming
in the Bearclaw River may expose them to unsafe levels of PCBs.
In addition, many Noblesville residents engage in sustenance fish-
ing on the Bearclaw River. Most fishing occurs from old pilings on
or near the public beach. A survey conducted by NUDEC con-
cluded that the average resident of Noblesville annually consumes
twelve pounds of fish from the Bearclaw River. Fish taken from
the Bearclaw River at locations on or near the public beach con-
tain levels of PCBs that exceed safety levels established by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). NUDEC and
FDA both have issued repeated public warnings against eating
fish from the Bearclaw River. The surveys conducted by NUDEC,
however, demonstrate that these warnings did not result in a dim-
inution of local consumption of fish from the river.
In the spring of 2005, Appellant-Noblesville spent $50,000 to
construct an eight-foot high chain link fence to prevent access to
the public beach and increase policing of the area to prevent swim-
ming and fishing in the Bearclaw River. Appellant-BRK spent
$500 on signs that it posted on the fence, which warned against
the dangers of the PCBs in the river and on the public beach. Al-
though residents continue to swim and fish in other portions of the
Bearclaw River, a 2005 NUDEC survey showed that local swim-
ming in the Bearclaw River and fish consumption decreased 30
percent and 25 percent, respectively, from the previous summer.
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B. Procedural History
After completing discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union. The District Court granted Major Elec-
tronic, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and denied those of
Bearclaw Riverkeeper, Inc. and the Town of Noblesville. The Dis-
trict Court's determination is the subject of this appeal by Appel-
lant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville.
Appellant-BRK brings five Clean Water Act claims against
Appellee, as well as a related CERCLA action. In Count I, Appel-
lant-BRK alleges that Appellee is in violation of CWA § 301(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a), for the discharge of pollutants from its PCB-
laden soil into the Bearclaw River without an NPDES permit is-
sued under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. In Count II, Appellant-
BRK alleges that Appellee's discharge of PCBs exceeds water
quality standards established by the state under CWA § 303, 33
U.S.C. § 1313. In Counts III, IV, and V, Appellant-BRK alleges
that Appellee is violating the federal and state common law of nui-
sance by polluting interstate waters that its members and the
public use. In Count VI, Appellant-BRK seeks reimbursement for
the $500 it spent on signage warning the residents of Noblesville
of the dangers of the PCBs on the public beach, in the Bearclaw
River, and in the fish and other aquatic life in the river. As relief,
Appellant-BRK seeks an immediate and mandatory injunction
against further violations of the Clean Water Act by Appellee and
the assessment of civil penalties for each day of such violation.
Appellant-BRK also seeks to enjoin Appellee from continuing its
activities that give rise to nuisance under federal and state com-
mon law.
Appellant-Noblesville has sought and was granted permissive
intervention to join Appellant-BRK in Counts II through V. Ap-
pellant-Noblesville has also added a claim for reimbursement of
$50,000 in response costs, spent to construct the chain-link fence
and increase policing at the Noblesville public beach, under CER-
CLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, (Count VI). As relief, Appellant-
Noblesville requests a declaratory judgment against Appellee for
all of Appellant-Noblesville's future costs of removing PCBs from
its public beach and the adjacent bed of the Bearclaw River.
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SECTION III:
COUNT I:
Whether PCB-contaminated Soil at Appellee's Manufacturing
Facility Is a "Point Source" Under CWA § 502(14),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
A. Facts
Over time, the soil beneath the Appellee's manufacturing fa-
cility in Fort Union, Progress has become contaminated with
PCBs. Following wet weather events, these PCBs percolate
through the soil and are carried by groundwater to the Bearclaw
River. The river carries the PCBs approximately one mile from
Fort Union, Progress, to Noblesville, New Union. The PCBs have
contaminated the soil on the banks of the Bearclaw River in New
Union, the Noblesville public beach, and the sediment of the river
itself.
Appellee does not dispute that New Union's water quality
standards for PCBs are violated after wet weather events or that
these violations are caused, largely, if not entirely, by Appellee's
PCBs.
B. Positions of the Parties
Appellee claims that the PCB-contaminated soil beneath its
manufacturing facility is not a "point source" as defined by the
Clean Water Act. Appellee relies on the legislative history and
statutory language of the Act to argue that the PCB-contaminated
soil beneath its manufacturing facility is not a "point source." Ap-
pellee also relies on decisions that indicate that a "point source"
must be a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance," and
that soil is not such a "conveyance." If the PCB-contaminated soil
is not a "point source" under the Act, then the leaching of the
PCBs from Appellee's soil into the Bearclaw River is not a "dis-
charge" prohibited by the Act.
Appellant-BRK maintains that the PCB-contaminated soil is
a "point source," and has presented evidence that the vadose zone
beneath Appellee's manufacturing facility is contaminated with
PCBs at depths that reach the water table. PCB-laden ground-
water flows from beneath Appellee's manufacturing facility to the
Bearclaw River. Because there is no source of PCBs other than
Appellee's manufacturing facility and because these PCBs are be-
ing conducted through Appellee's soil into the Bearclaw River, Ap-
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pellant-BRK maintains that the contaminated soil is a "point
source." Appellee does not dispute that its manufacturing facility
is the source of the PCBs or that the PCBs are reaching the Bear-
claw River. Like the Appellee, Appellant-BRK relies on the legis-
lative history and language of the Act to support its argument.
Appellant-BRK also relies on decisions that have held that natu-
ral systems, which have been altered by humans, are "point
sources" and are jurisdictional under the Act.
Appellant-Noblesville is not a party to this issue.
C. Law
1. The Statute
In its passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, Congress re-
flected the country's growing awareness of ecology as a body of
scientific study, stating, "[wiater moves in hydrologic cycles and it
is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source." S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972). Congress also recog-
nized that pollutants enter the hydrologic cycle through both point
and nonpoint sources of pollution. However, although Congress
recognized the ecology of pollution, it limited the scope of the CWA
to the regulation of "any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance" capable of the "discharge of a pollutant." See CWA §§ 502(6),
301(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(6), 1311(a).
The basic prohibition of the Clean Water Act is the "discharge
of any pollutant by any person" without an appropriate permit.
See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act defines "discharge
of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable wa-
ters from any point source." CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
A "point source" is
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, dis-
crete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feed-
ing operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irri-
gated agriculture.
CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Point sources are regulated through NPDES permits. CWA
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). NPDES permits are issued by ei-
ther the EPA or a state with an approved program. Id. See also
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CWA §§ 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), (b). When a state issues
a permit, it is generally referred to as an SPDES permit. Both
NPDES and SPDES permits contain effluent limitations and
water quality standards that the point source discharger must
maintain in order to stay within the confines of the Clean Water
Act. See CWA §§ 301(b)(1)(A), (C), 303, 304, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (C), 1313, 1314.
The Clean Water Act differentiates between "point source"
pollution, which it regulates, and "nonpoint source" pollution,
which it does not. Section 101(a)(7) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(7) provides that "it is the national policy that programs
for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and
implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of
[the Act] to be met." The Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to
develop "(1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature
and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and (2) processes,
procedures, and methods to control pollution" from an enumerated
set of activities that were exclusively defined as "nonpoint sources
of pollution." CWA § 304(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f). In a section enti-
tled "Identification and evaluation of nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion; processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution," the
Clean Water Act provides a list of nonpoint sources of pollution,
including:
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff
from fields and crop and forest lands;
(B) mining activities, including runoff and siltation from new,
currently operating, and abandoned surface and underground
mines;
(C) all construction activity, including runoff from the facilities
resulting from such construction;
(D) the disposal of pollutants in wells or in subsurface
excavations;
(E) salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of fresh water
flow from any cause, including extraction of ground water, irri-
gation, obstruction, and diversion; and
(F) changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any naviga-
ble waters or ground waters, including changes caused by the
construction of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow diver-
sion facilities.
CWA § 304(f)(2)(A)-(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(A)-(F).
The legislative history also makes clear that nonpoint sources
of pollution are limited to runoff that, following wet weather
[Vol. 23500
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events, carries pollutants over the soil's surface and into navigable
waters. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to classify nonpoint source pollution as runoff caused primarily by
rainfall around those types of activities that employ or cause pol-
lutants. This is illustrated by the Senate Report discussion of
what became CWA § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314:
Sediment, often associated with agricultural activities, is by vol-
ume our major pollutant, not only from the degrading effect of
the sediment, but because it also transports other pollutants.
Fertilizer and pesticide runoff are also major agricultural
nonpoint sources. Poor forestry practices, including indiscrimi-
nate clear cutting, may also generate substantial soil erosion
problems ....
One of the common problems associated with pollution control is
the dramatic increase in storm runoff when the earth's surface
is made impermeable. Thus highways, building, and parking
lots all contribute substantially to the accelerated runoff of rain-
water into natural water systems. The greater volume and
greater velocity produced high rates of erosion and siltation. In
addition, highway runoff often includes oil, rubber particles,
lead, asbestos and other elements or additives deposited on
highways as a result of vehicular traffic.
S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 52 (1972), reprinted in Legislative History of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at
530-35 (1973).
In 1987, Congress added section 319 to the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1329, providing a mechanism for states, territories,
and Indian tribes to receive federal grants as support for a variety
of activities taken at the state and local level to address nonpoint
source pollution. This section required states to address nonpoint
source pollution by conducting statewide assessments of their wa-
ters. These assessments purported to identify those waters that
do not fully support state water quality standards because of
nonpoint source pollution. See CWA § 319(a)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1329(a)(1)(A). The new section also required states to develop
nonpoint source management programs to address the impaired
or threatened waters identified in nonpoint source assessments.
See CWA § 319(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b). After the EPA approval,
states were required to implement these nonpoint source manage-
ment programs over a multi-year time frame. See CWA § 319, 33
U.S.C. § 1329.
20061
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From time to time, the EPA issues regulations that define and
clarify the regulated "point source" activities included in CWA
§ 304(f) and gives examples of "nonpoint sources." Generally,
some agricultural and silvicultural activities are to be regulated
as part of a state's SPDES program. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.23
(2005) (concentrated animal feeding operations); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.24 (concentrated aquatic animal production facilities); 40
C.F.R. § 122.25 (aquaculture projects); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26
(stormwater discharges); 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (silviculture). The
EPA also defines specific "point source" categories that are regu-
lated under the NPDES program as part of the activities listed in
CWA § 304(f). See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 405-471.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Courts have read the Clean Water Act broadly and recognized
that a regulated "point source" may include natural as well as
manmade elements, which together discharge pollutants into reg-
ulated waters. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620
F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding as "point sources" those con-
veyances of pollution formed either as a result of natural means or
human activity on the land). Courts have also stressed that, al-
though the definition of "point source" is important, "Congress has
placed liability with those in control of the pollutants being dis-
charged," regardless of the "point" at which the pollutants enter
regulated waters. See, e.g., Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738
F. Supp. 623, 629 (D.R.I. 1990) (quoting United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979)) (noting that fo-
cusing only on the statutory definition of "point source" isolates
"one subsection from the rest of a law that was written broadly to
reach to the fullest extent possible those sources emitting pollu-
tion into rivers, streams and lakes").
In Abston, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
"point source" existed in the absence of any "direct action" under-
taken by the defendant-mine operators, where runoff from their
strip mines contaminated a nearby water body. The District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama determined by sum-
mary judgment that there was no violation of the Clean Water Act
because there was no "point source" where a coal mining opera-
tion's sediment basin overflow and erosion of piles of discarded
material resulted in rainwater carrying pollutants into a naviga-
ble body of water. Abston, 620 F.2d at 43. The District Court
found that any pollutants that were deposited in the water body
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were "carried by natural forces, mostly erosion caused by rainwa-
ter runoff' rather than "'from any affirmative act of discharge by
the defendants."' Id. at 43-44 (citations omitted). The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the District Court interpreted the statutory defini-
tion of "point source" too narrowly, reversed the lower court's
decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
43, 46.
The defendants in the case operated strip coal mines near
Daniel Creek, a tributary of the Black Warrior River, in Tusca-
loosa County, Alabama. Id. at 43. Defendants' coal mining activi-
ties resulted in the creation of "spoil piles" of excavated soil and
drainage basins that it constructed to catch sediment flowing
down the outer edges of the spoil piles. Id. at 46. There was testi-
mony in the plaintiffs affidavits and depositions that "dirt, sand,
and other solid particles were transported from the spoil banks by
rainwater to Daniel Creek." Id. A witness for the defense testi-
fied that in some areas, drainage basins were constructed along a
"drainage course" and that, following a precipitation event, "water
and small amounts of sediment would drain through the sediment
basin outflow." Id. The president for the defendant company also
noted that "gullies would carry water and sediment toward the
creek." Id. Other evidence showed that rainwater trapped in the
mine pits themselves also "eventually percolated through the
banks [of the sediment basins] and flowed toward the creek, carry-
ing with it acid and chemicals from the pit." Id. at 47.
In considering the evidence, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
United States, which participated in the case as amicus curie, that
the surface runoff collected or channeled by the defendants consti-
tuted a "point source" discharge. Id. at 44. The government pos-
ited that the sediment basins dug by the defendants and "the
collection, and subsequent percolation, of surface waters in the
pits themselves" constituted point sources under the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 45. The government agued that the fact that pollu-
tants were carried away from the basins by gravity, rather than
"an affirmative act of discharge" by the defendants, was irrele-
vant. Id.
The Fifth Circuit agreed and framed the "ultimate question"
to be whether the sediment and contaminants were discharged
from "discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance[s]" by either
gravitational or nongravitational means. Id. The Court found
that
20061 503
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[n]othing in the [Clean Water Act] relieves miners from liability
simply because the operators did not actually construct those
conveyances, so long as they are reasonably likely to be the
means by which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navi-
gable body of water. Conveyances of pollution formed either as
a result of natural erosion or by material means, and which con-
stitute a component of a mine drainage system, may fit the stat-
utory definition and thereby subject the operators to liability
under the Act.
Id.
In coming to its determination, the Abston Court noted that
"[s]imple erosion over the material surface, resulting in the dis-
charge of water and other materials into navigable waters, does
not constitute a point source discharge." Id. at 44-45. It agreed
with the Fourth Circuit that the definition of point source "ex-
cludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters." Id. at 47
(citing Consol. Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 1979)
and Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th
Cir. 1976)). To constitute "point source" discharge regulated by
the Clean Water Act, surface runoff must have been "collected or
channeled" by the defendants in connection with their mining ac-
tivities. Id.
In Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 629
(D.R.I. 1990), the District Court for the District of Rhode Island
considered the definition of "point source" within the broader con-
text of the Clean Water Act's prohibition against the "discharge of
a pollutant." The Court cautioned that "the words 'point source'
should not be separated from the words 'addition of any pollutant,'
nor disassociated from what they are defining, 'discharge of a pol-
lutant." Id. The Court found that mincing the words of the stat-
ute in this manner "can lead to absurd results that do not promote
the purpose of the Clean Water Act ... [namely,] to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the na-
tion's waters and to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into nav-
igable waters." Id. To do this, the Court held, 'Congress has
placed liability with those in control of the pollutants being dis-
charged." Id.
The subject of the Sakonnet case was raw sewage that was
flowing from a failed septic system at the Sherwood Village resi-
dential development in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, into the Sakon-
net River. Id. at 626. The septic system failed in 1969 and, as a
result, the state closed the river to shellfishing and swimming in
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the area of the development. Id. at 627-28. In 1979, the Rhode
Island Department of Environmental Management ("DEM") in-
vestigated the septic system and found that approximately 8000
gallons per day of "raw sewage was running directly from the
leaching field, on the surface of the ground for approximately 250
feet, into the Sakonnet River" and through an outfall pipe. Id. at
628. After holding a formal hearing, DEM issued a notice of viola-
tion under Rhode Island law to the owners; the decision and order
that issued from this hearing found the owners solely responsible
for repairing the septic system. Id. The owners never complied
with the order and the town of Portsmouth made emergency re-
pairs to the outfall pipe. Id. No permit had been issued by any
federal or state agency authorizing the outfall pipe or its dis-
charge into the river. Id.
In 1988, the Friends of the Sakonnet, an unincorporated
homeowners association, and the Rhode Island Attorney General
brought citizen suits under the Clean Water Act, the Rhode Island
Clean Water Act, and state nuisance actions against the defend-
ants-the present and former owners of the land on which the
failed sewage system was located. Id. at 626-27 n.1. Plaintiffs
sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at 627.
After the complaints were filed, the defendants brought a third-
party complaint against the homeowners in the Sherwood Village
development and Portsmouth's financial director. Id. Defendants
claimed that the homeowners should be held jointly and severally
liable as the "point source" of the pollution; they claimed liability
against the town as the owner of the pipe that was discharging the
sewage into the Sakonnet River. Id.
The Court noted that, in their claims and cross-claims, the
parties overemphasized the importance of the stand-alone defini-
tion of "point source" and in doing so, isolated one subsection of
the Clean Water Act from "the rest of a law that was written
broadly to reach 'to the fullest extent possible those sources emit-
ting pollution into rivers, streams, and lakes."' Id. at 629 (quoting
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.
1979)). The Court noted that the "concept of point source was de-
veloped to distinguish pollution resulting from simple erosion over
the surface of the ground from pollution that has been collected or
comes from a confined system." Id. at 630. Thus, Congress pro-
vided a definition of "point source" in the Clean Water Act not to
be exhaustive about the regulated sources of pollution, but to dis-
tinguish "point source" from "nonpoint source" pollution. Id. The
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purpose of "point source" in the definition of "discharge of a pollu-
tant" is "to distinguish kinds of pollution, not to establish the
source of liability. Liability must lie with the person or persons
causing 'the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters."' Id.
The Sakonnet Court specifically cited Abston as support for this
conclusion:
Even the cases specifically concerned with determining if a
point source exists seem to recognize [that liability attaches to
the cause of the pollutants]. In [Abston], although the court was
not considering whether the defendant owned the "conveyance"
for the pollutants, the Sixth Circuit's determination of liability
is based on control of the pollutants that ultimately reach navi-
gable waters.
Id. at 630 n.12.
The Sakonnet Court had little patience with defendants' "at-
tempt to strain the definition of 'discharge of a pollutant' in order
to relieve themselves of liability," an effort that "makes complete
nonsense out of the Clean Water Act" and frustrates the intent of
Congress to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the nation's
waters. Id. at 631. The Clean Water Act "requires those in con-
trol of the pollutants to use the best available control technology
("BACT") to prevent harmful pollutants from being discharged" to
a water body. Id. As a result, the Court found against the defend-
ants, issued a preliminary injunction against them, and ordered
them to prevent any further discharge of pollutants into the
Sakonnet River. Id. at 637.
D. Discussion
1. Appellee's Argument: The PCB-Contaminated Soil Beneath
Appellee's Manufacturing Facility is Not a "Point Source" for
the Purposes of the Clean Water Act
Neither the Clean Water Act itself nor judicial interpretation
of the statute allows the Court to find that the soil beneath Appel-
lee's manufacturing facility is a "point source" for the purposes of
the Act. The plain language of the statute belies the idea that the
soil is a "point source," because "soil" does not appear in the statu-
tory definition. Further, the soil is neither a component of a "dis-
cernible, confined and discrete conveyance" created by Appellee,
nor a "conveyance" of any kind. As a result, the soil beneath the
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manufacturing facility is not a "point source" for the purposes of
the Clean Water Act.
a. The Plain Language of the Statute Does Not Allow the
Court to Find That the Soil is a "Point Source"
The definition of "point source" requires the presence of a "dis-
cernible, confined and discrete conveyance." CWA § 502(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). Courts agree with such a requirement. See Si-
erra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980). In
Abston, the Court found that defendants' had actively created a
"point source" because their spoil piles were "discernible, confined
and discrete conveyances" that carried rainwater and pollutants
to the Daniel River. Id. Appellee has not constructed any such
conveyance. Instead, PCBs reach the Bearclaw River through a
wholly natural process. As noted by the Abston Court, "[slimple
erosion over the material surface, resulting in the discharge of
water and other materials into navigable waters, does not consti-
tute a point source discharge." Id. at 44-45. If erosion over the
soil's surface is not a point source discharge, then saturation into
the soil cannot be found to be a point source discharge.
The soil itself is not a "discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance." Indeed, its ubiquity argues against its ability to be un-
derstood as "discernible, confined and discrete." While the soil
may be "discernible," it is neither "confined" nor "discrete" in any
manner contemplated by the plain language of the Clean Water
Act. At any rate, the statute's use of the connector "and" requires
all three of the adjectives to be applicable to the soil. Therefore,
the soil is not a "point source" as defined by the Clean Water Act.
Moreover, the definition of "point source" does not include
"soil" in its inclusive list. See CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14). As a result, the soil is not a statutory "point source."
b. The PCBs-If They Are "Pollution" at All-Are Nonpoint
Source Pollution, Which is Not Regulated by the Clean
Water Act
The Clean Water Act provides that "it is the national policy
that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be
developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to en-
able the goals of [the Act] to be met." CWA § 101(a)(7), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(7). The fact that these programs were to "be developed
and implemented" demonstrates that they did not exist at the
time of the Act's passage by Congress.
2006] 507
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Further, in 1987, Congress added section 319 to the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1329, providing a mechanism for states to address
nonpoint source pollution. The legislative history makes it clear
that "nonpoint sources of pollution" are limited to runoff carrying
pollutants over the soil's surface and into navigable waters after
wet weather events. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 52 (1972), re-
printed in Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, at 530-35 (1973). Consequently, the
regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution is beyond the scope of
the Clean Water Act. Because the PCBs are nonpoint source pol-
lution-if they are "pollution" at all-and nonpoint source pollu-
tion is not regulated under the Clean Water Act, Appellee cannot
be found liable for the migration of its PCBs into the Bearclaw
River.
2. Appellant-BRK's Argument: The PCB-Contaminated Soil
Beneath Appellee's Manufacturing Facility is a "Point
Source" Within the Meaning of the Clean Water Act
The PCB-contaminated soil beneath Appellee's manufactur-
ing facility is a "point source" as defined by the Clean Water Act.
This finding is supported by judicial interpretation of the term
"point source." Further, "point source" is in the definition of "dis-
charge of a pollutant" to distinguish kinds of pollution, not to es-
tablish the source of liability, which must lie with the person or
persons causing the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.
a. Appellee's PCB-Contaminated Soil is a Component of a
"Discernible, Confined and Discrete Conveyance" That
Discharges Pollutants into the Bearclaw River
The definition of "point source" includes the contaminated soil
beneath the manufacturing facility. "The term 'point source'
means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance." CWA
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). To satisfy the definition of point
source, the statute does not require that such a "conveyance" be
manmade; in fact, some of the elements of the definition's inclu-
sive list contemplate naturally occurring conveyances, such as a
"channel" or "discrete fissure." CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12). Thus, the ultimate question is whether pollutants
were discharged from a "discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance," whether manmade or naturally occurring.
The PCB-contaminated soil is "confined" and "discrete" because it
is exclusively that soil that is located beneath Appellee's manufac-
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turing facility. It is neither all of the soil on the banks of the river,
nor is it even all of the soil on the manufacturing site. Through
soil sampling, the PCBs can be identified as contaminating a "dis-
crete" portion of the soil. It is this confined soil that conveys pollu-
tants through the groundwater and into the Bearclaw River. As
Congress has recognized, "[wiater moves in hydrologic cycles and
it is essential that the discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source." See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972). As a natural pro-
cess, the hydrologic cycle is an element of a "discernible" convey-
ance that is "confined" to the "discrete" characteristics of
Appellee's contaminated soil. The type of soil, its location in rela-
tion to the water table, and its proximity to the Bearclaw River,
all combine to determine the rate at which the PCBs contained in
the soil migrate to the river after a wet weather event. It is not a
question as to whether the PCBs will be conveyed to the river; the
only variables are at what rate and in what concentration the pol-
lutants are conveyed by Appellee's contaminated soil into the
Bearclaw River.
Courts agree that a "point source" includes any combination
of intentional, unintentional, manmade, and natural discharges of
pollutants into navigable waters. Thus, "[g]ravity flow, resulting
in a discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part of a
point source discharge" if the human-induced activity introduced
the pollutants into the conveyance. See Sierra Club v. Abston
Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980). Nothing in the Clean
Water Act relieves Appellee from liability simply because it is not
engaged in "any affirmative act of discharge" of the PCBs. See id.
at 43. Likewise, it is irrelevant that Appellee did not construct the
conveyance through which its PCBs reach the Bearclaw River.
See id. at 45. So long as Appellee's PCB-contaminated soil is "rea-
sonably likely to be the means by which pollutants are ultimately
deposited into" the Bearclaw River, it is a statutory "point source."
Id. As the Abston Court held, "[clonveyances of pollution formed
either [naturally] or by material means, and which constitute a
component of a mine drainage system, may fit the statutory defi-
nition and thereby subject the operators to liability under the
Act." Id. In the present case, the conveyance is a combination of
naturally occurring and human-induced activity and, therefore,
subjects Appellee to liability under the Clean Water Act.
It contravenes the intent of the Clean Water Act, the struc-
ture of the statute, and judicial interpretation of the law, to ex-
empt from regulation any activity that emits pollution from an
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identifiable point. In the present case, both sides stipulate that
the operation of Appellee's manufacturing facility has contami-
nated the soil beneath the facility. Both sides also agree that nat-
ural advection is carrying these PCBs through the soil and
groundwater into the Bearclaw River. Consequently, because the
point of pollution is known (i.e., the PCB-contaminated soil be-
neath Appellee's manufacturing operations), and because pollu-
tants from this point are reaching the Bearclaw River, Appellee is
in violation of the Clean Water Act.
b. Congress Has Placed Liability with Those Who Control the
Pollutants Discharged into Our Nation's Waters
Appellee acknowledges that the soil beneath its manufactur-
ing facility is contaminated with PCBs that percolate through the
vadose zone to the groundwater, which then carries the pollutants
into the Bearclaw River. Nevertheless, Appellee argues that the
PCB-laden soil beneath its manufacturing facility is not a statu-
tory "point source" and, as a consequence, cannot be the basis for
liability under the Clean Water Act. In short, Appellee contests
the existence of a "point source" in this case. However, "[tihe con-
cept of point source was developed to distinguish pollution result-
ing from simple erosion over the surface of the ground from
pollution that has been collected or comes from a confined sys-
tem." Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D.R.I.
1990). "'Point source' is in the definition of 'discharge of a pollu-
tant' to distinguish kinds of pollution, not to establish the source
of liability. Liability must lie with the person or persons causing
'the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters." Id. Appellee's
manufacturing activities have resulted in the contamination of
the soil with PCBs. Once introduced into the natural hydrological
system by Appellee, these PCBs then percolate into the ground-
water which discharges into the Bearclaw River. Because Appel-
lee is responsible for the introduction of the PCBs into the soil, the
Court should find Appellee liable for the addition of the PCBs to
navigable waters.
In Abston, the Fifth Circuit premised defendants' liability
under the Clean Water Act on their control of the pollutants,
which, ultimately, reached navigable waters:
The ultimate question is whether pollutants were discharged
from 'discernible, confined and discrete conveyance[s]' either by
gravitational or nongravitational means. Nothing in the [Clean
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Water] Act relieves miners from liability simply because the op-
erators did not actually construct those conveyances, so long as
they are reasonably likely to be the means by which pollutants
are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water."
Abston, 620 F.2d at 45.
Similarly, the Sakonnet Court rejected the "absurd results"
arising from defendants' "[d]welling on the words 'point source' in
isolation," and held the owners of a failed septic system liable
under the Clean Water Act "for the noxious flow that has poured
freely into the Sakonnet River for the last twenty-one years."
Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 629-30 n.10. In that case, "[t]he defend-
ants' attempt to strain the definition of 'discharge of a pollutant'
in order to relieve themselves of liability and impose it on the
town of Portsmouth or on [neighboring landowners] makes com-
plete nonsense out of the Clean Water Act." Id. at 631. The Court
noted that the Act's purpose is to restore and maintain the integ-
rity of the nation's waters by eliminating the discharge of pollu-
tants into navigable waters or by requiring that the discharger
first obtain a permit. Id. at 631. To meet the purposes of the
Clean Water Act, "Congress has placed liability with those in con-
trol of the pollutants being discharged." Id. at 629.
In the instant case, Appellee is responsible for the introduc-
tion of the PCBs into the hydrological cycle and the eventual dis-
charge of the pollutants into the Bearclaw River. For decades,
Appellee has manufactured electrical equipment at its Fort Union
facility. Over the years, Appellee has spilled and leaked PCBs in
such quantities that the soil beneath the facility has become satu-
rated with the pollutants. Appellee does not contest that its PCBs
reach the Bearclaw River through advection to the groundwater,
which flows into the river. The soil beneath Appellee's manufac-
turing facility is the only known source of PCBs in this section of
the Bearclaw River. Appellee is aware that it is the source of the
PCBs and that the pollutants are present in its soil at depths that
reach the water table. Appellee is also aware that precipitation
greatly speeds the advection process, causing an increased concen-
tration of its PCBs to enter the Bearclaw River after it rains. Re-
gardless, Appellee has not taken any steps to stop the discharge of
its PCBs into the Bearclaw River. Because Appellee is responsible
for the pollutants that are discharged into the river, this Court
should find Appellee liable under the Clean Water Act.
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COUNT II:
Whether Appellee is Violating New Union's EPA-approved
Water Quality Standards and, If So, Whether Appellant-BRK
and Appellant-Noblesville Can Bring a Citizen Suit Under the
Clean Water Act to Enforce Those Standards.
A. Facts
New Union has adopted standards intended to regulate the
quality of its navigable waters. Presumably, New Union created
an inventory of all of its surface waters, divided these waters into
different classes, and placed the individual surface into such clas-
ses. Within this system, New Union has classified the relevant
portion of the Bearclaw River as "Class B," i.e., suitable for fishing
and contact recreational use. In addition to this "use" standard,
New Union's environmental regulator, NUDEC, has established
specific water quality criteria of amount X for PCBs in "Class B"
waters. The New Union legislature has passed a law stating that
"[tihere shall be no detectable PCBs in 'Class B' waters." See 43
N.U.R.A.C. § 78.04 (hypothetical statute for the Moot Court Com-
petition). As required by the Clean Water Act, the EPA approved
New Union's water quality standards. See CWA § 303(c)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3). Upon approval by the EPA, New Union's
water quality standards became "the water quality standard for
the applicable waters of that State." See CWA § 303(c)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).
Similar to New Union, the state of Progress has inventoried
and classified its surface waters. Progress has classified the rele-
vant portion of the Bearclaw River as "Class C," i.e., suitable for
industrial and non-contact use. Progress has not adopted the
EPA-approved specific water quality criteria for PCBs in "Class C"
waters. It is unclear whether Progress has obtained approval
from the EPA for its "use" standard; it is also unclear whether the
EPA, in the absence of the State's doing so, has established any
water quality criteria for PCBs for "Class C" waters in Progress.
See CWA § 303(a)(3)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(C).
Over time, the soil beneath the Appellee's manufacturing fa-
cility has become contaminated with PCBs. Following wet
weather events, these PCBs percolate through the soil and are
carried by groundwater to the Bearclaw River. The river carries
the PCBs approximately one mile from Fort Union, Progress to
Noblesville, New Union. The PCBs have contaminated the soil on
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the banks of the Bearclaw River in New Union, the Noblesville
public beach, and the sediment of the river itself.
B. Positions of the Parties
Appellee does not contest that New Union's water quality
standards for PCBs are violated after wet weather events or that
these violations are caused, largely, if not entirely, by Appellee's
PCBs. However, Appellee does argue that a violation of New
Union's water quality standards is not an enforceable violation of
the Clean Water Act. To the extent that Appellants' claim con-
templates nonpoint source pollution, it falls outside of the regula-
tion of the Clean Water Act. Further, Appellee argues that CWA
§ 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), under which Appellants have
brought suit, authorizes causes of action as against violations of
"an effluent standard or limitation," which the section defines as a
violation of CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, or a list of specific viola-
tions that do not include violations of water quality standards.
Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville argue that Appel-
lee's PCBs in the Bearclaw River violate New Union's water qual-
ity standards and that this violation is actionable under CWA
§ 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
C. Law
1. The Statute
The Clean Water Act seeks to attain "water quality which
provides for the protection and propagation of fish . . .and ...
recreation in and on the water." CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2). The Act anticipates that regulators at the state and
local level will work with federal agencies to "develop comprehen-
sive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert
with programs for managing water resources." CWA § 101(g), 33
U.S.C. § 1251(g).
To achieve these goals, the Clean Water Act establishes roles
for federal and state governments. The EPA must, inter alia, es-
tablish and enforce "effluent limitations" on industry-specific dis-
charges into the country's navigable waters. CWA §§ 301(b)(1)(A),
304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314. In addition, each state
must institute comprehensive water quality standards, subject to
federal approval, that establish water quality goals for all intra-
state waters. CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). As
discussed below, a state's authority to enforce water quality stan-
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dards is contained in sections 301, 401, and, by reference, 303 of
the Act. Finally, the Clean Water Act allows each state to enforce
"any State law or regulations," including those that involve water
quality standards, through a combination of the state certification
program, CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, and the "savings clause,"
CWA §§ 505(e), 510, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370.
Section 401 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, establishes the state
certification process, which allows states to approve or disapprove
of federal NPDES permits that will affect the quality of the state's
surface waters. Specifically, the certification process provides
that,
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any ac-
tivity... which may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certi-
fication from the State in which the discharges originates or will
originate. . . that any such discharge will comply with the appli-
cable provisions of sections [1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of
this title].
CWA § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The EPA may not issue a
federal NPDES permit unless and until the permit applicant ob-
tains certification from the state, or the state waives its right to
establish a certification process. Id.
A state may impose water quality limitations on "any activ-
ity" to be undertaken by the NPDES permit applicant, "including,
but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which
may result in any discharge into the navigable waters." CWA
§ 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The EPA's regulations that
implement the state certification process expressly require the
certifying state to find that "there is a reasonable assurance that
the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate
applicable water quality standards." 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3). If
the permit applicant's "activity" does violate applicable water
quality standards, then the applicant must either alter the activ-
ity or forgo the requested NPDES permit.
A water quality standard "consist[s] of the designated uses of
the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for
such waters based upon such uses." CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(2)(A). Water quality standards reflect
the water quality goals of a water body, or portion thereof, by
designating the use or uses to be made of the water and by set-
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ting criteria necessary to protect the uses. States adopt water
quality standards to protect public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and serve the purposes of the Clean Water
Act.
40 C.F.R. § 131.2.
In addition to defining "water quality standards," the EPA
has defined "designated uses" and "water quality criteria." "Des-
ignated uses are those uses specified in water quality standards
for each water body or segment whether or not they are being at-
tained." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(f). Water quality "[ciriteria are ele-
ments of State water quality standards, expressed as constituent
concentrations, levels, or narrative statements, representing a
quality of water that supports a particular use. When criteria are
met, water quality will generally protect the designated use." 40
C.F.R. § 131.3(b).
The Clean Water Act provides a state with three means by
which it can directly regulate the quality of its surface waters.
First, as discussed above, it can establish and administer a
SPDES permitting program. CWA § 402(a)(5), (b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(5), (b). Second, regardless of whether it has a SPDES
program, a state can approve or disapprove of the issuance of fed-
eral NPDES permits through its "certification" process. CWA
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Finally, the Clean Water Act creates a
"savings clause," which reserves to the state the right to apply its
own laws to the protection of its water resources. CWA § 510, 33
U.S.C. § 1370.
The authority of the certifying state extends beyond those dis-
charges contemplated in the NPDES permit application. The cer-
tification process allows the state to impose "other limitations" on
the project to assure compliance with the Clean Water Act and
with "any other appropriate requirement of State law":
Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any
effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring re-
quirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal
license or permit will comply with any applicable effluent limi-
tations and other limitations.., and with any other appropriate
requirement of State law set forth in such certification and shall
become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject o
the provisions of this section.
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CWA § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). The EPA has clarified that
"[in 401(d), the Congress has given the States the authority to
place any conditions on a water quality certification that are nec-
essary to assure that the applicant will comply with effluent limi-
tations, water quality standards, . . . and with 'any other
appropriate requirement of State law."' PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology (PUD No. 1), 511 U.S. 700, 712
(1994) (quoting EPA, Wetlands and 401 Certification 23 (Apr.
1989)).
Although section 401(d) does not explicitly reference section
303, ensuring compliance with a state's water quality standards is
a proper function of the state certification program, because the
Act allows states to impose limitations to ensure compliance with
section 301. See CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
Further, "'[siection 303 is always included by reference where sec-
tion 301 is listed.'" See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712 (1994) (quot-
ing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-830, at 96 (1977)). Section 301
provides that,
There shall be achieved .... any more stringent limitation, in-
cluding those necessary to meet water quality standards ....
established pursuant to any State law or regulations .... or any
other Federal law or regulation, or required to implement any
applicable water quality standard established pursuant to this
Act.
CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). As a result, the di-
rect reference to effluent limitations in the state certification pro-
cess includes reference to the state's water quality standards,
among the "other limitations" the state may impose to ensure
compliance with the certification process.
Thus, the Clean Water Act grants states the authority to im-
pose conditions on "any applicant" seeking a federal permit to dis-
charge pollutants into navigable waters. CWA § 401(a)(1), 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Further, the Clean Water Act expands a
state's authority to place restrictions on the applicant's activity in
order to ensure compliance with the statute or "other limitations,"
including appropriate state law requirements. Id. The state certi-
fication process includes the enforcement of water quality stan-
dards through the process's direct reference to the imposition of
effluent limitations.
Two sections of the Clean Water Act explicitly preserve a
state's right to enforce water pollution requirements that may be
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more stringent than those contained in an NPDES permit. Sec-
tion 510 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, states that "[eixcept as ex-
pressly provided ... nothing in this Act shall .... be construed as
impairing or in any other manner affecting any right or jurisdic-
tion of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States." Section 505(e) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e), provides that "[niothing in this section shall restrict any
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent stan-
dard or limitation or to seek any other relief." Collectively, these
two sections are generally referred to as the "savings clause" of the
Clean Water Act and preserve a state's right to establish and en-
force water quality standards for its surface waters.
The Clean Water Act imposes on the EPA a duty to protect
the interests of "downstream" states. Section 301 of the Clean
Water Act requires an NPDES or SPDES permit to impose any
effluent limitations necessary to comply with applicable state
water quality standards. See CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C).
As discussed above, section 402(b) authorizes each state to es-
tablish "its own permit program for discharges into navigable wa-
ters within its jurisdiction." CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
The upstream state's SPDES program must satisfy the Clean
Water Act's procedural protections for downstream states, includ-
ing providing notice and the opportunity to comment on the pro-
gram. CWA §§ 402(b)(3), (5), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(3), (5).
Although these provisions do not authorize the downstream state
to veto the issuance of a SPDES permit by the upstream state, the
EPA retains authority to block the issuance of any state-issued
permit that is "outside the guidelines and requirements" of the
Clean Water Act. See CWA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2).
A downstream state has similar protection against a dis-
charger operating under a federal NPDES permit. The EPA's is-
suance of such a permit is subject to the "same terms, conditions,
and requirements" as the upstream State's SPDES permit issu-
ance. CWA § 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3). In addition, the
EPA has construed the Clean Water Act as requiring federal
NPDES permits also to comply with CWA § 401(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). CWA § 401(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) provides that,
Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the
Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other State, the
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Administrator... shall so notify such other State, the licensing
or permitting agency, and the applicant. If... such other State
determines that such discharge will affect the quality of its wa-
ters so as to violate any water quality requirement in such
State.... and requests a public hearing on such objection, the
licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a hearing ....
Such agency ... shall condition such license or permit in such a
manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applica-
ble water quality requirements. If the imposition of conditions
cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such
license or permit.
Thus, this section appears to prohibit the issuance of a federal
NPDES permit over the objection of an affected state, unless com-
pliance with the affected state's water quality standards can be
ensured.
In issuing NPDES permits, the EPA "shall prescribe condi-
tions . . . to assure compliance with the requirements of [the
NPDES program] and such other requirements as [it] deems ap-
propriate." CWA § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). The EPA's
regulations provide that an NPDES permit shall not be issued
"[wihen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure the compliance
with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States." 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2005). See also 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.44(d). This restriction applies whether the permit is issued
by the EPA or by an approved state SPDES program. See 40
C.F.R. § 123.25 (2005). Finally, the Clean Water Act provides the
EPA with broad authority to oversee federal and state permit pro-
grams: "No permit shall issue ... if the Administrator... objects
in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the
guidelines and requirements of this Act." CWA § 402(d)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2).
2. Judicial Interpretation
The Supreme Court has recognized the central role of states
in upholding their water quality standards through both their
state certification process and the NPDES/SPDES permitting pro-
gram. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700 (1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
In PUD No. 1, the facts considered by the Supreme Court
dealt with whether the state environmental agency properly con-
ditioned a federal permit on the maintenance of water quality
standards that would maintain specific minimum stream flows to
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protect salmon and steelhead runs. PUD No.1, 511 U.S. at 703.
The specific issue before the Court was whether the minimum
stream flow requirement imposed by Washington State on a pro-
posed hydroelectric project was a permissible condition of the
state's certification process. Id. at 710. The Court found that
Washington State had acted within its authority and that the
minimum stream flow requirement fell within the scope of CWA
§ 401 as an enforceable water quality standard. Id.
The Court considered the petitioners' complaint, a city and lo-
cal utility district that wanted to build a hydroelectric plant on the
Dosewallips River in Washington State. Id. at 703. The project
would divert water from a 1.2-mile reach of the river (the "bypass
reach"), run the water through turbines to generate electricity,
and then discharge the water back into the river at a point below
the bypass reach. Id. at 708-09. Because the project required a
license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
and would result in discharges to a navigable water, petitioners
were required by the CWA to obtain Washington's certification of
the project. Id. at 709.
Under its administrative code, Washington had adopted com-
prehensive water quality standards intended to regulate all of its
navigable waters. Id. at 705. Washington had inventoried all of
its surface waters, which it divided into five classes. Id. Washing-
ton classified the Dosewallips River as "AA, extraordinary." Id.
The water quality standard for Class AA waters was set forth in
the Washington Administrative Code at 173-201-045(1), which
identified both the designated use of the water and the criteria
applicable to such waters. Id. at 705-06. As a Class AA water, the
Dosewallips River's characteristic uses included "[sialmonid mi-
gration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting. Other fish migration,
rearing, spawning, and harvesting [and] . . . [w]ildlife habitat."
Id. at 706 n.1. The water quality criteria for the Dosewallips in-
cluded specific numeric measurements for, inter alia, fecal
coliform, dissolved oxygen, temperature, and turbidity. Id. Pur-
suant to the requirements of the Clean Water Act, the EPA had
reviewed and approved Washington's water quality standards. Id.
at 707. In its assessment of petitioners' project and based on these
water quality standards, Washington undertook a study to deter-
mine the minimum stream flows necessary to protect the salmon
and steelhead fishery in the bypass reach. Id. at 709. Washington
issued a certification, which imposed a variety of conditions on the
proposed hydroelectric project, including the seasonal mainte-
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nance of minimum stream flows in the bypass reach. Id. Petition-
ers challenged the imposition of the conditions and the case made
its way through the appeals process to the Supreme Court.
With regard to the scope of Washington's certification author-
ity, petitioners argued that the minimum stream flow require-
ment imposed by the state was unrelated to the specific
discharges contemplated in its permit application. Id. at 711. Be-
cause the state's minimum flow requirement was not specifically
premised on the dam's discharges, the state lacked authority
under CWA § 401 to condition its certification on maintenance of
stream flows sufficient to protect the Dosewallips' fishery. Id.
The Court dismissed petitioners' argument, noting that CWA
§ 401 applies to "any applicant," not to a "discharge" and, as such,
"allows the State to impose 'other limitations' on the project in
general to assure compliance with various provisions of the Clean
Water Act and with 'any other appropriate requirement of State
law."' Id. The Court noted that its interpretation of the statute
was consistent with the EPA's regulations implementing the certi-
fication process, which "expressly interpret § 401 as requiring the
State to find that 'there is a reasonable assurance that the activity
will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable
water quality standards."' Id. at 712 (quoting 40 C.F.R.
§ 121.2(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court found the
EPA's determination that activities must also comply with water
quality standards to be reasonable and "entitled to deference." Id.
(citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
The Court also found that the scope of Washington's certifica-
tion authority included ensuring compliance with water quality
standards. Id. The Court noted that, although CWA § 303 "is not
one of the statutory provisions listed in § 401(d), the statute al-
lows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance with § 301
of the Act." Id. at 712-13. In turn, CWA § 301 incorporates CWA
§ 303 by reference. Id. at 713. As a result, Washington's mini-
mum stream flow water quality standards that it adopted pursu-
ant to CWA § 303 "are among the 'other limitations' with which a
State may ensure compliance through the § 401 certification pro-
cess." Id.
In its determination of the case, the Court considered whether
the minimum stream flow requirement was a permissible limita-
tion upon which Washington could condition its certification. Pe-
titioners argued that CWA § 303 required the state to protect
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designated uses "solely through implementation of specific 'crite-
ria.'" Id. at 714. According to this argument, the Clean Water Act
did not allow Washington to require petitioners "to operate their
dam in a manner consistent with a designated 'use'; instead, ....
under § 303 the State may only require that the project comply
with specific numerical 'criteria."' Id.
The Court made short order of this argument through a plain-
language reading of the statute, which requires that state water
quality standards "'consist of the designated uses of the navigable
waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters
based upon such uses."' Id. at 714 (quoting CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added)). The Court found that
the statutory "text makes it plain that water quality standards
contain two components . . . [and a]ccordingly, under the literal
terms of the statute, a project that does not comply with a desig-
nated use of the water does not comply with the applicable water
quality standards." Id. at 714-15. A state may rightfully deny
certification to a project that does not comply with both the desig-
nated uses and the water quality criteria of the state's water qual-
ity standards. Id. at 715.
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the Court considered the issue of
whether the EPA's finding that discharges from a new source lo-
cated in Arkansas, the upstream state, would cause a detectable
violation of the water quality standards of Oklahoma, the down-
stream state. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 94 (1992).
The Court discussed at length the "EPA's duty to protect the inter-
est of the downstream State." Id. The EPA holds this duty
through its administration of the NPDES permitting program, the
"primary means for enforcing" water quality standards. Id. at
101. As a result, the NPDES permitting program provides a rea-
sonable basis for the EPA to exercise its "substantial statutory
discretion" and require an upstream discharger to comply with a
downstream State's water quality standards. Id. at 107.
The relevant facts of Arkansas are as follows: In 1985, the
City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, applied to the EPA for an NPDES
permit to discharge treated sewage effluent into an unnamed
stream in northwestern Arkansas. Id. at 95. The stream flows
"through a series of three creeks for about seventeen miles, and
then enters the Illinois River at a point twenty-two miles up-
stream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border." Id. Fayetteville's
NPDES permit imposed specific limitations on the quantity, con-
tent, and character of the sewage discharge and included a special
20061
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provision that, if a study then underway indicated the imposition
of "more stringent limitations . .. to ensure compliance with
Oklahoma's water quality standards, [then] the permit would be
modified to incorporate those limits." Id.
Oklahoma challenged Fayetteville's permit in an administra-
tive hearing before the EPA, charging that the sewage discharge
violated Oklahoma's state water quality standards. Id. The case
proceeded through the administrative law channels and, ulti-
mately, the EPA sustained the issuance of Fayetteville's NPDES
permit, conditioned on the requirement that its discharge not
detectably violate Oklahoma's water quality standards. Id. at 95-
98. Dissatisfied with the terms imposed by the EPA on the per-
mit, both Arkansas and Oklahoma sought judicial review in the
Court of Appeals. Id. at 97. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
EPA that the CWA required Fayetteville to comply with
Oklahoma's water quality standards, but then went on to reverse
the EPA's issuance of the permit, relying on a theory that neither
side had advanced. Id. at 98. Namely, the Court held that the
EPA may not issue an NPDES permit to a proposed source where
such a source "would discharge effluents that would contribute to
conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water
quality standards." Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the issue of whether the CWA requires the "EPA, in crafting and
issuing a permit to a point source in one State to apply the water
quality standards of downstream States." Id. at 104. Wary of
transgressing the EPA's "substantial statutory discretion," the
Court reframed the question and found that "[e]ven if the Clean
Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge to
comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards, the statute
clearly does not limit the EPA's authority to mandate such compli-
ance." Id. at 105.
The Court briefly analyzed the statute and its regulations to
come to its conclusion. First, "[slince 1973, EPA regulations have
provided that an NPDES permit shall not be issued 'when the im-
position of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applica-
ble water quality requirements of all affected States." Id. at 105
(internal citations omitted). This restriction applies equally to
NPDES and SPDES permits. Id. at 105 n.10. Second, several pro-
visions in the Clean Water Act vest the EPA with "broad discre-
tion to establish conditions for NPDES permits." Id. at 105. For
example, CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) "expressly
identifies the achievement of state water quality standards as one
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of the Act's central objectives. The Agency's regulations condition-
ing NPDES permits are a well-tailored means of achieving this
goal." Id. at 106. In addition, section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342, requires "that for EPA-issued permits 'the Administrator
shall prescribe conditions . . . to assure compliance with the re-
quirements of [this section] and such other requirements as he
deems appropriate,'" including State water quality standards. Id.
at 105 (quoting CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (emphasis added)).
Finally, the Court noted that the EPA's regulations "were a per-
fectly reasonable exercise of the Agency's statutory discretion [be-
cause] ... the application of state water quality standards in the
interstate context is wholly consistent with the Act's broad pur-
pose 'to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters."' Id. at 105-06 (quoting CWA
§ 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). As a result, the Court found reasona-
ble the EPA's use of the NPDES permitting process to impose a
downstream state's water quality standards on an upstream dis-
charger in another state.
D. Discussion
1. Appellee Argument: State Water Quality Standards Are Not
Enforceable Under the Clean Water Act
In the preceding action, the District Court considered the
question of whether Appellee's PCBs violate New Union's water
quality standards for PCBs and, thereby, create a cognizable
cause of action under the Clean Water Act. Appellee does not con-
test that New Union's water quality standards for PCBs were vio-
lated after wet weather events or that the violations were largely,
if not entirely, caused by Appellee's PCBs entering the Bearclaw
River. Instead, Appellee argues that a violation of New Union's
water quality standards is not an enforceable violation of the
Clean Water Act because such violation is not the result of a "dis-
charge," and further, is not a violation of an "effluent standard or
limitation."
Appellee's contention is without basis. The Clean Water Act
creates a number of enforcement avenues through which the ap-
propriate federal or state regulatory agency, or private citizens,
can bring suit against a polluter to stop the degradation of our
nation's waters. One of these avenues is the citizen suit provision
which authorizes "any citizen" to commence a civil action against
"any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
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standard or limitation under this Act ... or (B) an order issued by
the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation." CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). In the pre-
sent case, both Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville are ap-
propriate "citizen[s]," who may commence an action as against
Appellee for its violation of both an "effluent standard or limita-
tion" and "an order issued by" the State of New Union "with re-
spect to such a standard or limitation." Id. See also CWA § 505(g),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (defining "citizen").
Further, as decided by the Supreme Court, the EPA has sub-
stantial statutory discretion to impose permit conditions to ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected states. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105-07
(1992). In fact, the EPA's regulations require it to do so. See id.
In the current case, Appellee does not argue that New Union's
water quality standards for PCBs are violated after wet weather
events or that these violations are caused by Appellee's PCBs.
New Union has classified the Bearclaw River as "Class B" waters
and has adopted limitations for PCBs in "Class B" waters in
amount X. Contrary to Appellee's argument, New Union's water
quality standards do not merely characterize the use and criteria
of water bodies within the state. Instead, they are conditions that
the EPA shall prescribe to ensure compliance with the NPDES
permitting program. See CWA § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2).
As a result, this Court should require the EPA to revise Appellee's
existing NPDES permit to ensure compliance with New Union's
water quality standards for PCBs. This Court should also find
that Appellee is in violation of an "effluent standard or limitation"
for the purposes of this citizen suit action.
2. Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville Argument: State
Water Quality Standards Are Enforceable Under the Clean
Water Act
A violation of a state's water quality standards is an actiona-
ble violation of an "effluent standard or limitation" because CWA
§ 505(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f), defines "effluent standard or limita-
tion" to include either the discharge from a point source, or the
existence of an in-state certification process. However, even
though Appellee is incorrect in its contention that citizen suits are
limited to enforcing violations of CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a), Appellants' ability to prevail on Count II is conditioned
on whether this Court finds that the PCB-contaminated soil is a
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"point source" under Count I. If so, then Appellants should be
able to proceed with their claim that Appellee's unpermitted point
source violates an "effluent standard or limitation" under CWA
§ 505(f). If the Court finds that the PCB-contaminated soil is not
a point source, then the PCB discharge is implicitly defined as
nonpoint source pollution that is not regulated under the Clean
Water Act and is, therefore, beyond the reach of this citizen suit.
However, regardless of whether this Court finds that the
PCBs are point source or nonpoint source pollution, Appellant-
BRK and Appellant-Noblesville should still be able to bring suit as
against Appellee in this Court pursuant to the Clean Water Act's
"savings clause." In this case, New Union has adopted water qual-
ity standards for PCBs in the Bearclaw River and a state statute
regulating PCBs in "Class B" waters, see 43 N.U.R.A.C. § 78.04.
Section 505(e) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), provides that
"[niothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek
any other relief." In this context, water quality standards can be
defined as an effluent standard. New Union has enacted a desig-
nated use for the relevant portion of the Bearclaw River, i.e.,
"Class B" waters, and water quality criteria of amount X for PCBs
in "Class B" waters. New Union has also enacted a state law,
which provides that "[tihere shall be no detectable PCBs in 'Class
B' waters." See 43 N.U.R.A.C. § 78.04. As a result, CWA § 505(e)
should allow Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville it to bring
suit against Appellee for violating "any right" that the parties'
have under 43 N.U.R.A.C. § 78.04 to seek enforcement of New
Union's water quality standards or any other relief.
COUNTS III, IV, AND V:
The issues under these counts include the following:
" Whether the Clean Water Act So "Occupies the Field" of
Interstate Water Pollution That It Pre-empts Appellants
From Bringing Nuisance Actions Sounding in Federal and
State Common Law and Arising From Appellee's Nonpoint
Source Pollution of the Bearclaw River
" Whether the Clean Water Act Pre-empts State Common
Law of Nuisance for Nonpoint Source Pollution Originating
in Another State
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* Whether Appellant-BRK May Maintain a Public Nuisance
Claim on Behalf of Its Members Under the "Special Injury"
Rule
A. Facts
The facts relevant to Counts III, IV, and V are substantially
the same as the facts recited earlier in section II.A. above.
B. Positions of the Parties
Appellee argues that the Clean Water Act preempts both the
federal common law of nuisance and the state common law of nui-
sance in states other than the state in which a discharge occurs.
On this basis, Appellee contends that the public nuisance claims
of Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville must fail. Further,
Appellee argues that private parties may bring a public nuisance
claim only if they suffer an injury different from the injuries suf-
fered by the general public. Appellee continues that, because Ap-
pellant-BRK is a private party and does not suffer injuries
different from those of the general public, Appellant-BRK does not
have standing to sue and its claim must be dismissed.
Appellant-BRK argues that the Clean Water Act does not pre-
empt either federal or state common law of nuisance, because it
does not "occupy the field" of nonpoint source pollution. Further,
Appellant-BRK contends that its members do suffer "special in-
jury" because, unlike the general public, they are an ethnic minor-
ity and economically disadvantaged. Appellant-BRK's members
rely on the Noblesville public beach as a recreation destination
and engage in sustenance fishing on the Bearclaw River. As a re-
sult, they are more vulnerable than the general public to exposure
to PCBs in the soil, water, and fish. Consequently, because fed-
eral or state law does not preempt the common law of nuisance,
and because its members suffer "special injury," Appellant-BRK
asserts that Appellee is liable under nuisance law.
Appellant-Noblesville agrees with Appellant-BRK that the
Clean Water Act does not preempt claims of nuisance arising
under either federal or state common law. However, Appellant-
Noblesville contends that, as the local government, it, rather than
Appellant-BRK, is the appropriate party to bring a public nui-
sance action on behalf of all of its residents. Appellee does not
argue that Appellant-Noblesville is the proper plaintiff in the pub-
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lic nuisance action, but continues to maintain that the Clean
Water Act precludes such an action.
C. Law
1. The Clean Water Act's Pre-emptive Force as to Federal
Common Law
Prior to the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, states
premised transboundary water pollution disputes on the federal
common law of nuisance and brought suit to abate such nuisance
directly to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New
York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)). The Court heard these cases in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction over controversies between
states. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (providing that the judicial power
extends to controversies between two or more states and to contro-
versies between a state and citizens of another state and specify-
ing that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases in
which a state shall be a party). The Court recognized that it was
the body uniquely capable of resolving disputes that, if they "arose
between independent sovereignties, might lead to war." Missouri
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906) (explaining the Court's prior
decision in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), which upheld
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear an interstate pollution
dispute). Thus, in a series of cases that spanned seven decades,
the Court adjudicated interstate water pollution disputes and
fashioned a federal common law of nuisance. See Vermont v. New
York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91 (1972); New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931);
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496,
518; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). On several occa-
sions, the Court used its equitable powers to issue injunctions re-
stricting interstate pollution or requiring that states construct
waste disposal facilities. See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York,
284 U.S. 585; Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930); Georgia v.
Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
In the early 1970s, however, as environmental problems be-
came increasingly prominent national issues, the Court began to
signal a fundamental shift in its attitude toward resolving trans-
boundary water pollution disputes. In the months before the pas-
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sage of the Clean Water Act, Illinois sought leave from the
Supreme Court to file a bill of complaint against four Wisconsin
cities and the sewerage commissions of the city and county of Mil-
waukee. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S.
91 (1972). Illinois alleged that the cities and county were dis-
charging 200 million gallons per day of raw or inadequately
treated sewage into Lake Michigan and that it, and its subdivi-
sions, prohibited such discharges. Id. at 93. Illinois sought an or-
der from the Supreme Court requiring that the nuisance created
from the sewage be abated. Id.
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, a unanimous Court declined
to exercise its original jurisdiction because the dispute was not be-
tween two states and Illinois could otherwise seek redress in fed-
eral court. Id. at 108. However, although the Court declined to
grant Illinois' request for leave, it did not preempt the federal
common law of nuisance. Instead, the Court recognized that the
various laws that Congress had enacted "touching interstate wa-
ters" were "not necessarily the only federal remedies available."
Id. at 101, 103. The Court noted that the "application of federal
common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable
waters is not inconsistent with [existing federal legislation]." Id.
at 104. The Court presaged, however, that,
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time preempt the field of federal common law of
nuisance. But until that time comes to pass, federal courts will
be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging crea-
tion of a public nuisance by water pollution.
Id. at 107.
On May 19, 1972, Illinois again filed suit against the City of
Milwaukee and other Wisconsin cities in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois, this time seeking
abatement under federal common law of the alleged nuisance cre-
ated by the cities' sewerage discharges. See Illinois ex rel. Scott v.
City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Five months
later, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, which established a new system of regula-
tions that prohibited the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters. See CWA §§ 301, 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342.
As required by the new legislation, the defendant Wisconsin cities
obtained discharge permits from the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, which the EPA had authorized to operate the
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state's federal permit program. See EPA v. State Water Control
Res. Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 208 (1976).
On January 11, 1977, trial commenced on Illinois' federal
common law nuisance claim. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 8
Envtl. L. Rep. 20503 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The District Court found
that Illinois had proven the existence of a nuisance under federal
common law and ordered the defendant Wisconsin cities to abate
their discharges. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Clean Water Act had not preempted the federal common law of
nuisance, but that "[in] applying the federal common law of nui-
sance in a water pollution case, a court should not ignore the Act
but should look to its policies and principles for guidance." City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979). The de-
fendant Wisconsin cities sought review of the Seventh Circuit's
decision by the Supreme Court. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 445
U.S. 926 (1980).
On December 2, 1980, the parties argued before the Supreme
Court and focused largely on the question of whether the Clean
Water Act had preempted the federal common law of nuisance.
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304
(1981). To determine when federal common law should apply to
water pollution disputes, the Court articulated a preemption test:
In order to determine whether a federal statute displaces federal
common law, the Court should undertake "an assessment of the
scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by
Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by federal
common law." Id. at 315 n.8.
The Court applied this test to Illinois' nuisance complaints
against the defendants' discharges to Lake Michigan and found
that the Clean Water Act had created a permit scheme that ad-
dressed the very concerns raised by Illinois. Id. at 305. As a re-
sult, because the Milwaukee II facts fell precisely within the
rubric of the NPDES permitting scheme, the Court was not free to
formulate different federal standards "through application of often
vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity
jurisprudence." Id. at 307. The Court thus held that the Clean
Water Act preempts the federal common law of nuisance in inter-
state water pollution cases that involve the discharge of a pollu-
tant from a point source. Id. at 317. The Court premised its
holding on a separation of powers argument:
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Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal
standards to the courts through application of often vague and
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurispru-
dence, but rather has occupied the field through the establish-
ment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency... the Amendments were viewed
by Congress as a 'total restructuring' and 'complete rewriting' of
the existing water pollution legislation considered in [Milwau-
kee I] . .. Congress' intent in enacting the Amendments was
clearly to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollu-
tion regulation. Every point source discharge is prohibited un-
less covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger
to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to
achieve its goals.
Id. at 317-18 (citations omitted).
2. The Clean Water Act's Preemptive Force As to State
Common Law
The Court in Milwaukee 1I left open the question whether the
1972 Amendments had supplanted state common law remedies, in
addition to the federal common law remedy. See id. at 310 n.4.
The Court subsequently addressed the issue of whether the Clean
Water Act preempted a state's common law of nuisance in Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 483 (1987). The ques-
tion presented was whether the Clean Water Act preempts a
common law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Ver-
mont law, when the source of the alleged injury was located in
New York. In the courts below, Vermont property owners claimed
that pollution discharged into Lake Champlain by a paper mill
located in New York constituted a "continuing nuisance" under
Vermont common law. Oullette v. Int'l Paper Co., 602 F. Supp.
264, 266 (D. Vt. 1985). The paper mill was operating pursuant to
and in compliance with an NPDES permit. Id. The basis of the
Vermonters' claim was that discharges from the paper mill fouled
the waters around their properties, "interfering with the use and
enjoyment of the property and, consequently, diminishing its
value." Id. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and injunctive relief which would require the paper
company to restructure part of its water treatment system. Id.
The Vermont District Court acknowledged that federal law
generally governs interstate water pollution, but found that two
sections of the Clean Water Act explicitly preserve state law
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rights of action. Id. at 268. First, the Act provides that except as
expressly provided, "'nothing in this chapter shall . . .be con-
strued as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or juris-
diction of the States with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such States.'" Id. (quoting CWA § 510, 33
U.S.C. § 1370). Second, the statute provides that "'nothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of per-
sons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other
relief ... .'" Id. (quoting CWA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)). The
Vermont District Court held that these two provisions together
constituted a "savings clause," which made it clear that federal
law did not preempt entirely the rights of states to control pollu-
tion. Id. The Court held that a state action to redress interstate
water pollution could be maintained under the common law of the
state in which the injury occurred. Id.
In adopting its holding, the Vermont District Court rejected
the position of the Seventh Circuit that the "savings clause" pre-
served state nuisance law only as it applies to discharges occur-
ring within the source state. Id.; see also Illinois v. Milwaukee
(Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). The Vermont Dis-
trict Court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Oullette v. Int'l
Paper Co., 776 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
Second and Seventh Circuits. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Oullette, 475
U.S. 1081 (1986).
The Supreme Court found that the Clean Water Act did not
preempt the state common law nuisance action, but limited the
state law applicable to an interstate discharge to be "the law of the
State in which the point source is located." Oullette, 479 U.S. 481,
487. The Court reasoned that allowing affected states to impose
their own separate discharge standards on source states would in-
variably create a serious interference with achievement of the full
purposes of Congress. Id. at 493-94. Holding a discharger in an-
other state liable for violating more stringent requirements of
state nuisance law in the receiving state would compel the dis-
charger to adopt different control standards than those approved
by the EPA in the discharger's home state. Id. at 495. The inevi-
table result would be to allow states to "do indirectly what they
could not do directly-regulate the conduct of out-of-State
sources." Id. This would undermine the predictability and effi-
2006]
41
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ciency of the Clean Water Act's NPDES permit scheme and could
subject a discharger to a variety of "vague" and "indeterminate"
common law rules adopted by downstream states. Id. at 496.
Thus, the Court found that, in situations involving an other-
wise valid NPDES permit in the source state, state common law
actions founded on the law of the receiving state were preempted.
Id. at 500. However, the Court also held that "nothing in the Act
bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursu-
ant to the law of the source State." Id. at 497. Because the Clean
Water Act expressly preserves the right of states to impose more
stringent standards on their own point sources, actions brought
under the nuisance law of source states will not interfere with the
balance of interests reflected in the Act. Id. at 498-99. Because
federal courts sitting in diversity are competent to apply the law
of other states, the Oullette plaintiffs were free to continue their
lawsuit in Vermont's federal district court so long as it applied
New York nuisance law to their claims. Id. at 500.
,3. The Regulation of Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the
Clean Water Act: CWA § 319
In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to add a pro-
vision that addresses nonpoint source pollution. This new section,
CWA § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329, requires states to prepare, for ap-
proval by the EPA, "State assessment reports" and "State man-
agement programs" for the control of nonpoint source pollution
within each state. CWA §§ 319(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(a), (b).
States with approved nonpoint source management programs are
eligible, on a cost-sharing basis, to receive technical assistance
and federal grants to aid in the implementation of the program.
See CWA §§ 319(f), (g), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329 (f), (g). States with dis-
approved nonpoint source management programs are not eligible
to receive such assistance and, further, must revise and resubmit
their plans to the EPA for approval. See CWA § 319(d)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1329(d)(2).
4. The Law of Public Nuisance
A public nuisance is an "unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 821B(1) (1979). In contrast, a private nuisance is "a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land." Id. § 821D. An interference with a public
right may be "unreasonable" where it significantly affects the pub-
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lic health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience, or is of a "contin-
uing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect"
upon the public right. Id. § 821B(2)(a). The Restatement makes
clear that "[clonduct does not become a public nuisance merely be-
cause it interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large
number of persons. There must be some interference with a pub-
lic right." Id. § 821B cmt. g. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides an example:
[Tihe pollution of a stream that merely deprives fifty or a hun-
dred lower riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes
connected with their land does not for that reason alone become
a public nuisance. If, however, the pollution prevents the use of
a public bathing beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream
and so deprives all members of the community of the right to
fish, it becomes a public nuisance.
Id.
Generally, to maintain a proceeding to abate a public nui-
sance, a party must have authority as a public entity. Id.
§ 821C(2)(b). A private entity may bring a public nuisance claim,
however, where it can show that it has the right to recover dam-
ages and standing to sue as a representative of the general public
or as a citizen in a citizen's action. Id. §§ 821C(2)(a), (c). A private
entity has a right to recover damages where it can show that it
suffered "harm of a kind different" from that suffered by other
members of the general public. Id. § 821C(1). To demonstrate
this special injury, it is not enough that the private entity has suf-
fered the same kind of harm or interference, but to a greater ex-
tent or degree, than that suffered by the public at large. Id.
§ 821C cmt. b. "Difference in degree of interference cannot, how-
ever, be entirely disregarded in determining whether there has
been difference in kind." Id. § 821C cmt. c.
"Special injury" is illustrated in Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538
N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 1989), a case in which commercial fisher-
men brought a public nuisance claim against General Electric for
its discharge of PCBs into the Hudson River. The fishermen as-
serted "special damages" from lost revenues and damage to their
trade that resulted from the New York State Department of Con-
servation's ban on the sale of striped bass caught in the Hudson
River. Leo, 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845. The Court granted the com-
mercial fishermen standing on the basis of their demonstration of
harm peculiar to them that "went beyond the harm done to them
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as members of the general community." Id. at 849. Courts will
not find a "special injury" where the plaintiff claims only to have
suffered economic loss. See, e.g., Allen v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 03-
711, slip op. 51345U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2003).
D. Discussion
1. Appellee Argument: The Clean Water Act Preempts the
Federal Common Law of Nuisance
In the instant case, Appellants seek to bring a federal com-
mon law of nuisance claim against Appellee to abate the nuisance
caused by the migration of PCBs to the Bearclaw River and the
Noblesville public beach. However, the Clean Water Act preempts
the federal common law of nuisance because it "occupies the field"
of water pollution regulation. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
(Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 317-18 (1981). See also Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
11 (1981). Any claim that the Appellants seek to bring against
Appellee must be brought under the Clean Water Act, which has
established an all-encompassing program of water pollution regu-
lation. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 310-11.
2. Appellee Argument: The Clean Water Act Preempts a
State's Common Law of Nuisance in States Other Than the
State in Which a Discharge Occurs
The Clean Water Act preempts state common law of nuisance
in states other than the state in which a discharge occurs. This is
so, because to apply the nuisance law of the affected state
would subject the point source to the threat of legal and equita-
ble penalties if the [source State's] permit standards were less
stringent than those imposed by the affected State. Such penal-
ties would compel the source to adopt different control stan-
dards and a different compliance schedule from those approved
by the EPA.
Int'l Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
As a result, if Appellee's contaminated soil is found to be a
point source, then the Clean Water Act applies, and Appellants
must bring any state common law of nuisance claims under the
state law of Progress, not New Union. If, however, the soil is not a
regulatory point source, then the Clean Water Act does not apply,
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and Appellants may bring state nuisance claims against Appellee
under the law of New Union.
3. Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville Argument: The
Clean Water Act Does Not Preempt the Federal Common
Law of Nuisance for Nonpoint Source Pollution
Appellee is incorrect in its assertion that the Clean Water Act
preempts the federal common law of nuisance with regard to
nonpoint source pollution. The Clean Water Act preempts federal
common law of nuisance where the underlying claim is against a
point source discharger. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 317-18.
To determine whether a common law cause of action is pre-
empted by federal legislation, the court must assess the scope of
the legislation and determine whether the scheme established by
Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by federal
common law. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 315 n.18. At federal com-
mon law, a nonpoint source polluter could be required to abate any
nuisance arising from its activities. However, the Clean Water
Act does not contain any enforcement mechanism by which the
EPA can compel a nonpoint source polluter to reduce his impact
on public health or the environment. CWA § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329
is not incorporated into the NPDES permitting program. As a re-
sult, nonpoint source pollution is not regulated by the Act and no
federal legislation preempts the imposition of federal common law
to abate it.
Therefore, the "scheme" created by Congress to address the
problem of nonpoint source pollution does not address the problem
formerly governed by the federal common law of nuisance. As a
result, the Clean Water Act does not preempt the federal common
law of nuisance for nonpoint source pollution.
4. Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville Argument: The
Clean Water Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law of
Nuisance for Nonpoint Source Pollution
Appellee asserts that the Clean Water Act preempts state
common law of nuisance for nonpoint source pollution in states
other than the state in which a discharge occurs. This contention
would mean that the Act's "savings clause" applies to only the
common law of the discharging state. Appellee's argument would
preclude downstream states from suing polluters in upstream
states, an outcome that is contrary to both the text of the statute
and its judicial interpretation. This assertion is incorrect.
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As is the case with federal common law, the Clean Water Act
does not preempt state common law of nuisance for nonpoint
source pollution, because, again, nonpoint source pollution is
outside the purview of the Act. Further, the Clean Water Act con-
tains two provisions that, together, create a "savings clause,"
which preserves "both a State's right to regulate its waters, . . .
and an injured party's right to seek relief under 'any statute or
common law."' Oullette, 479 U.S. at 492 (quoting CWA § 505(c), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e)). In the case of point source dischargers of pollu-
tion, which are regulated by the Clean Water Act, the appropriate
state common law is that of the source state, rather than the com-
mon law of the affected state. Id. at 495.
In the case of nonpoint source dischargers of pollution, how-
ever, the downstream state should be able to apply its own com-
mon law of nuisance, because doing so does not interfere with any
aspect of the Clean Water Act. As noted in the Oullette dissent,
states have adopted two different conflict of law approaches to de-
termine which state nuisance law should be applied. Id. at 503
n.1. The traditional rule is lex loci deliciti and requires the appli-
cation of the tort law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred.
See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 145 (2005)). The rationale
behind this rule is that because the affected state possesses a
strong interest in redressing injuries to its citizens, its law should
apply. The alternative rule employs an "interest-analysis" ap-
proach. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
Under this analysis, if the primary purpose of the tort rule is to
control the wrongdoer's conduct, then the source state's nuisance
law may be applied. Alternatively, if the main purpose of the rule
is to compensate those harmed by the wrongdoer's acts, the court
may apply the affected state's public nuisance law. In the present
case, this would mean that a party injured in New Union by Ap-
pellee's PCBs should be able to maintain a public nuisance claim
against Appellee based either on New Union's common law, or
that of Progress.
5. Appellee Argument: Appellant-BRK Does Not Have
Standing to Bring a Public Nuisance Action Against
Appellee Because It Cannot Demonstrate That Its Members
Suffer "Special Injury"
Appellant-BRK is a private plaintiff and as such, lacks stand-
ing to bring a common law public nuisance suit on behalf of its
members, whether under federal or state law because it cannot
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demonstrate that its members suffer "special injury." Appellant-
BRK argues that the injury suffered by its members from Appel-
lee's alleged nuisance is the curtailment of the members' recrea-
tion and fishing on the Bearclaw River. Recreation and fishing
are rights common to the general public. Even if Appellant-BRK
can demonstrate that injury to its members, an ethnic minority
and economically-disadvantaged group, is more severe than that
of the general public, that injury is not different in kind, but only
different in degree from that suffered by the public at large. Thus,
Appellant-BRK cannot demonstrate "special injury" to its mem-
bers and, as a result, does not have standing to sue Appellee
under a federal or state common law theory of nuisance.
6. Appellant-BRK Argument: Appellant-BRK Has Standing to
Bring a Public Nuisance Action Against Appellee If It Can
Demonstrate That Its Members Suffer "Special Injury"
In the preceding action, the Progress District Court held that
Appellant-BRK could not bring a public nuisance claim against
Appellee because the Clean Water Act had preempted such a
claim under either federal or state law. The District Court also
denied Appellant-BRK's public nuisance claim because "its mem-
bers do not suffer 'special injury"' that the law requires a private
party to demonstrate in order to establish standing to sue. The
District Court found that the injury suffered by Appellant-BRK's
members was "exactly the same as the injury to public rights,
namely, curtailment of recreation and fishing on the Bearclaw
River." Appellant-BRK contends on appeal that its members do
suffer "special injury," because, unlike the general public, they are
an ethnic minority and an economically disadvantaged group.
Many of Appellant-BRK's members engage in sustenance fishing
on the Bearclaw River. As a result, they are more vulnerable than
the general public to exposure to PCBs in the soil, water, and fish.
In addition, Appellant-BRK may be able to show that its
members have suffered more than just economic loss if it can
demonstrate that, as a poor community, the Proto-Litigians are
exposed to more PCBs, are less able to resist them, and have less
access to health care than the general public. While PCBs may
affect both the general public and the Proto-Litigians, the minor-
ity community's subsistence fishing activities are more negatively
impacted and the rate of their injury is qualitatively different
than that of the general public. As a result, Appellant-BRK may
20061
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be able to demonstrate that it has standing to sue Appellee for
public nuisance.
7. Appellant-Noblesville Argument: Appellant-Noblesville Is a
Proper Plaintiff in Its Public Nuisance Action Against
Appellee
In the court below, Appellant-Noblesville brought an action
against Appellee for violating New Union's public nuisance law by
polluting the Bearclaw River with its PCBs. Appellant-Nobles-
ville argued that, as the local government, it was a proper plaintiff
and that Appellee's PCBs constituted a public nuisance because
they interfered with public rights to fish and recreate on the Bear-
claw River. The District Court dismissed Appellant-Noblesville's
public nuisance claims as preempted by the Clean Water Act.
As discussed above, the Clean Water Act does not preempt
Appellant-Noblesville's public nuisance action against Appellee.
Appellee's PCBs "prevent[ I the use of a public bathing beach" or
"deprive[ ] all members of the community of the right to fish" and,
therefore, are a public nuisance." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 821B cmt. G (1979). As the local government, Appellant-Nobles-
ville is the appropriate party to maintain a proceeding to abate
the public nuisance caused by Appellee's PCBs. See id.
§ 821C(2)(b). Furthermore, in the preceding action, Appellee did
not argue that Appellant-Noblesville was an improper plaintiff in
its public nuisance action and, as a result, has waived its right to
do so here.
COUNT VI:
The issues under this count include the following:
" Whether Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville Have
Claims for Reimbursement and Summary Judgment Against
Appellee Under CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), in the
Absence of a Pending or Previous Action Under CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
" Whether Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville Have
Claims for Reimbursement and Summary Judgment Against
Appellee Under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, Where
Appellant-Noblesville Is Also a Liable Party Under That
Section.
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A. Facts
In the instant case, Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Noblesville
seek reimbursement for funds they have expended to reduce the
extent of exposure of Noblesville's residents to Appellee's PCBs on
the public beach, in the Bearclaw River, and in the fish. Appel-
lant-BRK spent $500 on signs warning against the dangers of
PCBs on the beach and in the river. Appellant-Noblesville spent
$50,000 to construct an eight-foot-high chain-link fence to prevent
access to the public beach and to increase policing in the area to
prevent swimming and fishing in the Bearclaw River. The court
below dismissed both parties' claims, noting that a party may not
bring an action for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (2000), without also bringing a costs recovery action
under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §9606 or § 9607(a).
The lower court also found that, because Appellant-Noblesville is
not an "innocent party," it may not maintain any type of CERCLA
claim against Appellee.
B. Positions of the Parties
Appellee argues that Appellant-BRK and Appellant-Nobles-
ville cannot seek contribution from it under CERCLA § 113(f), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f), in the absence of a previous or pending action
under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Appellee further argues
that Appellant-Noblesville may not recover any of its $50,000
from it because Appellant-Noblesville is itself a PRP and, as a re-
sult, may not sue Appellee.
Appellant-BRK argues that Appellee is liable under CERCLA
§§ 107 or 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613, for the $500 BRK spent on
signs warning the public of the dangers presented by Appellee's
PCBs on the beach and in the river.
Appellant-Noblesville argues that Appellee is liable under
CERCLA §§ 107 or 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613, for the $50,000
that it spent on constructing the chain-link fence and increasing
policing of the beach and the river.
C. Law
1. The Statute
Congress created CERCLA after it became clear that RCRA
was inadequate to address sites already contaminated with haz-
ardous waste. CERCLA gives the EPA power to respond to an ac-
tual or threatened release of a hazardous substance by cleaning
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up the waste itself, then suing the statutorily defined PRPs for
reimbursement of the response costs. CERCLA §§ 106, 107, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. It also permits private parties that incur
response costs to seek reimbursement from PRPs. CERCLA,
§ 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). These private parties do
not need to be "innocent parties," but can themselves be PRPs
seeking reimbursement from other PRPs. See Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994) (holding that CERCLA
§ 107 "unquestionably provides a cause of action for [PRPs] to
seek recovery of cleanup costs").
CERCLA also provides private parties with a right to contri-
bution in certain circumstances. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f). Contribution is a "right to demand that another who is
jointly responsible for a third party's injury supply part of what is
required to compensate the third party." Black's Law Dictionary
329 (7th ed. 1999). However, contribution is available only to
those PRPs that have been sued under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,
543 U.S. 157 (2004).
CERCLA liability depends on proving four basic elements: (i)
hazardous substances were disposed of at a facility; (ii) there has
been a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
from the facility into the environment; (iii) the release or
threatened release requires the expenditure of response costs; and
(iv) the defendant is a PRP. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). The PRPs are: (i) the facility's current owner or opera-
tor; (ii) the facility's owner or operator at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance; (iii) any person who arranged for the
disposal, treatment, or transportation by another entity of hazard-
ous substances ("arranger"); and (iv) any person who transported
hazardous substances to facilities selected by another person
("transporter"). CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
The Solid Waste Disposal Act, referred to in CERCLA
§ 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29), defines "disposal" as the
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or plac-
ing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any con-
stituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into
the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Courts have
distinguished between a CERCLA "disposal" and "release," noting
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that the former requires some form of "active human intervention"
in order for CERCLA liability to attach. See, e.g., United States v.
150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705-706 (6th Cir. 2000). Finally,
the statute defines "facility" to mean "any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located." CERCLA § 101(9)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B). A PRP can avoid liability only if he proves
one of CERCLA's narrowly defined defenses: that the release was
caused by an act of God, an act of war, or the act or omission of a
third party. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
CERCLA provides for the recovery of specified costs, as
follows:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out [in accordance with the statute].
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Con-
tingency Plan ("NCP") was established to supplement CERLA.
The purpose of the NCP "is to provide the organizational structure
and procedures for preparing for and responding to ... releases of
hazardous substances .... ." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2005). "The NCP
provides . . . procedures for undertaking response actions pursu-
ant to CERCLA .... ." 40 C.F.R. § 300.3(b)(4). The regulations
further provide as follows:
For the purpose of cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA:
(i) A private party response action will be considered 'con-
sistent with the NCP' if the action, when evaluated as a
whole, is in substantial compliance with the applicable re-
quirements in paragraphs (5) [e.g., documentation and eval-
uation of the cleanup activity] and (6) [e.g., opportunity for
public comment on cleanup plan] of this section, and results
in a CERCLA-quality cleanup ....
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40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i).
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court recognized that CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), "al-
lows persons who have undertaken efforts to clean up properties
contaminated by hazardous substances to seek contribution from
other parties liable under CERCLA." Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall
Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 160 (2004). The Court emphasized that
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), "specifies that a party
may obtain contribution 'during or following any civil action'
under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a)." Id. However, before a party
can seek contribution from a PRP under CERCLA § 113(f), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f), it must first sue that PRP under either CERCLA
§ 106 or § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a):
The first sentence [of CERCLA § 113(f)], the enabling clause
that establishes the right of contribution, provides: 'Any person
may seek contribution ... during or following any civil action
under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title.' The natural meaning of this sentence is that contribution
may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely,
'during or following' a specified civil action.
Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted). Thus, a PRP cannot sue for con-
tribution unless it has been sued itself.
D. Discussion
1. Appellee Argument: Appellee Is Not Liable for Contribution
Under CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), in the Absence
of a Previous or Pending Action Under CERCLA § 107, 42
U.S.C. § 9607
Appellee is correct in its assertion that neither Appellant-
BRK nor Appellant-Noblesville can bring a contribution claim
against it in the absence of a previous or pending action under
CERCLA § 107. This issue was addressed and decided by the
Court in Cooper Industries, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165. As a result,
because neither Appellant-BRK nor Appellant-Noblesville have
filed suit under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a) against Appellee, they
may not bring an action for contribution in this Court as against
Appellee.
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2. Appellant-BRK Argument: Appellee Is Liable for BRK's $500
Response Costs Under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607
CERCLA § 107(a) would allow Appellant-BRK to bring a suit
against Appellee if it were a PRP; i.e., if it owned land that had
been contaminated by the PCBs and that contamination
presented a threat to the public or the environment. However,
Appellant-BRK is not a PRP in this case, because the only contam-
inated land at issue belongs either to Appellee or Appellant-
Noblesville. As a result, this Court should find that Appellee is
not liable to Appellant-BRK for its $500 in signage expenses.
3. Appellant-Noblesville Argument: Appellee Is Liable to It for
Its $50,000 Response Costs Under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607
Unlike Appellant-BRK, Appellant-Noblesville owns property
contaminated by Appellee's PCBs and should be able to bring suit
under CERCLA § 107 against Appellee. CERCLA § 107(a) allows
actions against the "owner or operator" of a "facility" where "haz-
ardous substances" were "disposed" of when those hazardous sub-
stances are "released or threatened to be released" into the
environment. Appellant-Noblesville owns or operates the public
beach where the PCBs were disposed of after they were released
into the environment through the actions of Appellee. As a PRP,
Appellant-Noblesville can bring suit against Appellee for the re-
imbursement of its recovery costs. As the Court noted in Cooper
Industries, Inc., CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) "allows any person who
has incurred costs for cleaning up a hazardous waste site to re-
cover all or a portion of those costs from any other person liable
under CERCLA." 543 U.S. 157, 172. Thus, this Court should find
that Appellant-Noblesville can bring suit against Appellee for the
recovery of its "necessary costs of response" that are "consistent
with the national contingency plan."
The threshold question then becomes whether the $50,000 ex-
pended by Appellant-Noblesville to construct an eight-foot-high
chain-link fence and increase policing to keep residents off the
PCB-contaminated beach are "consistent with the national contin-
gency plan." CERCLA does not define the phrase "cost of re-
sponse." The statute does, however, define "response" as "remove,
removal, remedy, and remedial action; ... all such terms ... in-
clude enforcement activities related thereto." CERCLA § 101(25),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). CERCLA further defines "remove" and "re-
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moval" in section 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), and "remedy" and
"remedial" action in section 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Thus,
it appears that the costs of removal and remedial actions are costs
of response.
If Appellant-Noblesville can demonstrate that its construction
of the fence and increased policing were elements of a larger re-
moval or remediation plan, it should be able to recover the
$50,000 it expended as long as the costs were consistent with the
NCP. To be consistent with the NCP, Appellant-Noblesville's ex-
penditures must be part of an overall response or remedy, which,
"when evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with" the
documentation and evaluation requirements of CERCLA, provides
opportunity for public comment on the cleanup, and "result[s] in a
CERCLA-quality cleanup." See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3). A court
should find that Appellant-Noblesville's $50,000 are recoverable if
they were undertaken as part of a larger plan to remove or reme-
diate the PCBs from the beach and the Bearclaw River. Appellee
would then be able to avoid liability only he proves that the re-
lease of PCBs was caused by an act of God, an act of war, or the
act or omission of a third party. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b). None of these narrowly defined defenses appear to be
available to Appellee.
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